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Abstract 
This paper aims at analyzing whether Active Labour Market 
Programs (ALMP) could have different effects on unemployment 
and employment dynamics according to the particular region 
where the program is implemented. To this end, the research 
analyses alternative theoretical and econometric models thought to 
capture the possible effects that active labour market policies 
might have on labour forces dynamics. The econometric 
methodologies implemented are the Generalized Method of 
Moment (GMM) and the Panel Vector Autoregression (P-VAR). 
The evidence emerging from the GMM models suggests that the 
effects of ALMP on unemployment are not similar across the 
Italian regions. It follows that some active programs are likely to 
exert a greater effect in the South than in the North. The results of 
the P-VAR estimated models are synthesized in the impulse 
response analysis and the forecast error variance decomposition. 
The impulse response analysis suggests that an increase in ALMP 
lead to: (i) a decrease in the unemployment rate, and (ii) significant 
increase in labour force participation. More interestingly, results 
obtained from the error-variance decomposition analysis show that 
unemployment movements are not driven by shocks in the ALMP 
and that, especially in the northern regions, atypical contracts 
shocks account for a substantial portion of unemployment 
dynamics. 
 
JEL Codes: C33, J64 








Since the beginning of the Nineties, the OECD Jobs Study has 
emphasised the role of active labour market policies (ALMP) in 
reducing structural unemployment. 
Moreover, the European Employment Strategy, launched in 
the Luxembourg Job Summit and restated in the Lisbon strategy, 
assigns to ALMP the task of increasing investments in human 
capital as well as of attracting more people to the labour market. 
The reason why a government should adopt ALMP in reducing 
unemployment can be demonstrated by a variety of theoretical 
models. In these models, the implementation of ALMP leads to a 
positive effect on the matching process as well as on job 
competition. Other advantages are related to a rise in productivity 
and to a better allocation of labour among sectors and to 
geographic mobility.  
However, in spite of theoretical and political preferences on 
ALMP spending, real data show a quite different picture. In the 
period from 1985 to 2000, the OECD countries did not significantly 
increase expenditure on active programmes as a percentage of 
the GDP - less than 1%, on the average. Moreover, there is no 
tendency to switch resources from passive to active programmes. 
Actually, there are ambiguous effects that ALMP might have 
on the regular labour demand. An active labour policy might 
produce a crowding-out effect through the well-known deadweight 
effect, the substitution effect, or an accommodation effect on wage 
setting.  
For these reasons, the net employment effect of ALMP is an 
empirical issue. From this consideration, derives the importance of 
monitoring and evaluating the ALMP. 
There is a large quantity of empirical literature focusing on 
whether ALMP have positive effects on unemployment. Most of 
these studies apply microeconometric techniques to evaluate the 
effects of ALMP on individual performance. Other studies use 
macroeconometric models to analyze the net effect of ALMP on 
the whole economy.  7
In this paper, we have chosen a macroeconomic perspective. 
The empirical analysis is based on a variety of econometric 
techniques thought to capture the possible effects that active 
labour market policies might have on employment and 
unemployment dynamics. In particular, the aim of the paper is to 
assess whether ALMP might have asymmetric effects in different 
regions where the program applies. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 
analyzes the OECD view concerning the ALMP effectiveness in 
reducing the structural unemployment. In Section 3, the paper 
focuses on the theoretical effect of ALMP. In Section 4, the study 
highlights some peculiarities of the Italian labour market. Section 5 
moves to the empirical models of labour market policies and 
presents the results of the GMM and the P-VAR models. The 
section also presents the main results of the impulse response 
analysis as well as of the forecast error variance decomposition. In 
Section 6, concluding remarks end the paper. 
2. The ALMP and the OECD Perspective 
The well-known OECD Jobs Study (OECD, 1994; OECD, 
1996) strengthened the emphasis on active labour market policies 
(ALMP) as a means of fighting the structural unemployment 
(Layard, Nickell and Jackman, 1991). The general agreement was 
on the need to shift the focus of labour market policies from the 
passive provision of income support to more active measures 
which assist reemployment. The reason was that subsidies, raising 
the reservation wage, have strong negative effects on the length of 
unemployment and on job search intensity. Active labour 
measures, on the other hand, can improve the matching of the 
demand and supply of labour and reduce the long-term 
unemployment of disadvantaged workers1. 
                                                 
1 OECD criteria split public spending on labour programmes into so-called 
“active and “passive” measures.  The former aims at improving the employability 
of the unemployed by raising their job-related skills and the functioning of the 
labour market. We distinguish five groups of measures:  (1) public employment 
services, (2) labour market training, (3) youth measures, (4) subsidized  8
The European Employment Strategy (EES), launched in the 
Luxembourg Job Summit (November, 1997), on the basis of the 
new provisions in the Employment Title of the Treaty, and 
revamped in the Lisbon strategy (Lisbon European Council, March, 
2000), has given a new impulse to ALMP, stressing its importance 
not only as an alternative to subsidies but also in itself. As a matter 
of fact, the European Strategy assigns to ALMP the task of 
increasing the adaptability of workers and enterprises, of attracting 
more people to the labour market and of making the investment in 
human capital more effective by adopting a preventive and more 
active approach towards the unemployed (Commission of 
European Communities, 2003).  
Country reviews have however revealed that ALMP have been 
quite a limited success, suffering from ineffective delivery, 
monitoring and evaluating mechanisms, as well as poor targeting 
and other design problems. This means that, in spite of theoretical 
and political preference in favour of ALMP spending, data show a 
quite different picture. Spending on active programmes on the 
average in the OECD countries increased very little from 1985 to 
2000 as a percentage of the GDP (from 0.7 to 0.8) (Martin and 
Grubb, 2001). The same trend occurred in the European countries 
(from 0.9 to 1.0). There is no tendency to switch resources from 
passive to active programmes, both moving in accordance with 
unemployment. Figures 1 and 2 show the evolution of expenditure 
in active and passive policies across various EU and non-EU 








                                                                                                              
employment, (5) measures for the disabled. The latter are income transfers to 
unemployed, namely (1) unemployment benefits, and (2) early retirement 
pensions paid for labour market reasons (Martin and Grubb, 2001).  9
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Source: OECD, Employment Outlook, various issues  10
 
In terms of the level of expenditure, measured as a share of 
the GDP, three groups of countries can be distinguished. The first 
group includes countries such as Denmark, the Netherlands and 
Belgium, which had a high level of expenditure in both active and 
passive policy measures during the 1980s. An intermediate group 
includes countries with a higher than average expenditure in 
active, but not in passive income support, such as Sweden and 
Italy, and countries with a higher than average expenditure in 
passive, but not active measures, such as Spain. The last and 
largest group includes countries such as Japan, the USA, Austria, 
Portugal, Greece and Switzerland, with a very low level of 
expenditure in both active and passive measures. From the ‘80s to 
the ‘90s, the policies in the three groups of countries have not 
changed. There has been a general reduction in expenses for 
passive measures, while a group of European countries -Spain, 
France, Germany and Finland- have substantially increased 
expenditure for active measures. Sweden, on the contrary, has 
reduced its percentage of ALMP.  
Figure 3 shows that the hypothesis of a direct negative 
relation between ALMP expenditures and the unemployment rate 
is not verified. As a matter of fact, countries with a low percentage 
of ALMP/GDP, but also the countries that designate a higher 
proportion of the GDP to ALMP, have a lower unemployment rate. 

























































3. The Theoretical Effects of ALMP 
From a theoretical point of view the effects of ALMP can be 
studied by two models the conclusions of which are very similar: 
the well-known Jackman, Layard and Nickell labour market 
framework, distinguishing between a wage-setting and a labour-
demand relationship (Jackman, Layard and Nickel 1991; Calmfors 
1994; Calmfors and Lang 1995) and the Beveridge Curve 
framework derived from a matching function combined with job 
search theory2. To better analyze the ALMP functioning over the 
labour market, we can refer to the second type of model.  
                                                 
2 The theoretical foundations of the Beveridge Curve are substantially 
twofold: the first, starting from a model of Hansen, derives the matching function 
from an aggregation over distinct markets in the presence of frictions and of 
limited mobility of labour. The second refers to a model of matching in a stock-
flow framework. For a recent review see Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001.  12
The Beveridge Curve (or uv curve) represents the non-linear 
negative relationship between the unemployment rate u=U/(U+E) 
and the vacancy rate v=V/(V+E), where E is employment: 
 
() uv f u =    f’<0 e f”>0    (1) 
 
It can be shown that the slope and shifts of the curve are due 
to the behaviour of workers in finding a job, the behaviour of 
employers in screening applicants for the vacancy and to the 
‘matching technology’ in the labour market by which searching 
workers and searching firms are brought together. 
In a stock-flow model, the change of unemployed stock ( U ∆ ) 
can be viewed as a result of the inflow (I) of workers into the 
unemployment poll coming from the non-labour forces (p) or from 
employees (e) and the outflow (O) of workers from unemployment 
toward the two statuses in a period of time (t): 
 








t O O I I U + − + = ∆                    (2) 
 
The same dynamics can be adopted for the change in the 
stock of vacancies. 
∆V = Qt −Ot
e                  (3) 
Q represents the number of new vacancies registered in time t and  
Ot
e  is the number of filled vacancies that corresponds to the 
outflow of unemployed workers toward employment, assuming that 
there aren’t vacancies neither filled by workers coming from the 
non-labour force pool nor cancelled vacancies.  
The usual hypothesis is:  
The inflow from employment into unemployment is a 
percentage (s) of the employment stock (E): 
 
It
e =stEt           (4) 
where s is the separation rate.  13
The outflow from unemployment toward employment can be 
formalized as a percentage (v) of unemployment: 
 
              Ot
e = vtUt          (5) 
 
where v can be viewed as the average probability that an 
unemployed worker at the beginning of period t finds a job during 
period t.  
On the other hand, the outflow from vacancies can be written 
as a percentage (p) of V: 
 
        Ot
e = ptV t            (6) 
 
where p can be described as the probability of matching, i.e. the 
probability that a given vacancy gets filled by an unemployed 
worker during period t.  
Consequently, the change of unemployment stock in period t 
can be rewritten as: 
 
          ∆U=stEt −ptV t +It
p −Ot
p      (7) 
 
 We can refer to the matching model (Hall, 1977; Pissarides, 
1990) to identify the factors determining the matching probability p. 
As stated before, the matching probability derives from the ways 
by which the match between unemployed workers and unfilled jobs 
takes place, from the behaviour of workers in searching for a job 
and from the behaviour of employers in screening applicants for a 
vacancy. Therefore, the probability depends on the probability that 
a vacancy will be contacted by at least one job seeker (contact 
probability c) and the probability that the job contact took place 
(acceptance probability r):     
 
tt t pc r =              (8) 
 
Under very simple initial assumptions on job seekers and 
vacancy supply characteristics (Hall, 1977), we cam hypothesize  14
that contact probability derives from the relation between 
unemployment (U) and vacancies (V). In other words, the greater 
the number of vacancies to the number of unemployed, the higher 
the contact probability, and consequently, the higher the probability 
that an unemployed worker fills a job. 
The probability of a job searcher getting a contact with an 
employer is 1/V. Therefore, the probability that unemployed 
workers don’t contact employers placing vacancies can be written, 
assuming a sufficiently high number of vacancies, as (Hall, 1977): 
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Probability c is due, also, to two other variables: the fraction of 
active job seekers over total unemployed workers (α ), that means 
that in a labour market where there are many active searchers in 
the unemployment pool, even a small increase in vacancies leads 
to a relatively strong reduction in unemployment; furthermore, the 
probability of contact is due to a mismatch by regions, by 
occupations and by qualifications (γ ). Therefore the contact 
probability can be written as: 




αγ =−           (9) 
 
A simple job search model (McCall 1970; Mortesen 1970; 
Pissarides, 1990) provides us the determinants of acceptance 
probability r. The decision of a job seeker to accept a job is based 
on an optimization problem according to which he finds “the 
optimal duration of a job search by comparing the discounted 
earnings from the best wage offer found during his search with the 
discounted search costs” (Frish 1984, pag. 62). The reservation 
wage (wr) represents, therefore, the expected return from pursuing 
the best stopping rule. This, besides, is influenced by direct and 
indirect search costs and unemployment benefits. In the same 
way, the employer acceptance decision arises from a comparison 
of the applicants productive capacity, not easy to establish a priori  15
and then determined by some screening process affected by 
variables such as employment subsidies, individual characteristics 
of workers and skill level, and his reservation productivity level (zr) 
for a given job. 
The acceptance probability can, therefore, be written as: 
 
(,)







r < 0 
 
Inserting (9) and (10) in (6), the matching function becomes: 
 
t
V U r r
t
e
t V e z w r O
t t ) 1 )( , (
/ αγ − − =
             (11) 
 
In other words, the matching function could be interpreted as a 
constant return production function of job matches where the 
inputs are the unemployed and vacancies.    
The essential characteristics of the Beveridge curve can be 
derived by applying the steady state conditions to the flow model 
of unemployment. The steady state conditions are  0 U ∆=  and 
0 E ∆=, and the flow equation (7), after the substitutions becomes:  
 
t





t V e z w r E s O I
t t ) 1 )( , (
/ αγ − − = + −
          (12) 
the characteristic of which is to be a negative convex function 


























Finally, after dividing all variables of (12) by labour forces Ls, 
the condition U=V (or u=v where u=U/Ls and v=V/Ls) determines 
the natural rate of unemployment (NRU), i.e. structural and  16
frictional unemployment corresponding to the equilibrium in the 
labour market: 



















       
Therefore, the slope of the Beveridge Curve depends on the 
search intensity of job seekers and on labour market mismatches, 
while the NRU depends also on the reservation wage and 
reservation productivity.  
As stressed in Jackman, Pissarides and Savouri (1990), active 
labour policies significantly affect the position and slope of the 
Beveridge curve3. Indeed, more active than passive labour 
policies cause the Beveridge curve to shift to the origin of axis 
since they reduce labour market mismatches and search frictions. 
Moreover, ALMP make a given job creation programme more 
effective with regard to employment and they also cause flattering 
of the curve. Finally, the matching process is speeded up as 
obstacles are removed. 
Calmfors, 1994 analyzes various effects of ALMP, 
distinguishing between: (i) effects on the matching process; (ii) 
effects on the competition for jobs; (iii) productivity effects; (iv) 
effects on the allocation of labour among sectors and geographic 
mobility; (v) direct crowding-out effects on regular labour demand; 
and (vi) accommodation effects on wage setting. 
ALMP, particularly job-broking and counselling activities, make 
the matching process more efficient as they promote a more active 
search by the job seekers. In our model, the coefficient affected by 
this type of treatment effect is α  i.e. the fraction of active job 
seekers over total unemployed workers. As a matter of fact, the job 
searcher pool (S) is composed of unemployed (U) and ALMP 
participants (P), and we can write:  
                                                 
3Jackman, Pissarides and Savouri, 1990, pag. 480.  17
SUa P ′ =+  
 Where  a′ is an index of search intensity. If the search 
intensity of the ALMP participant to ALMP is greater (a′>1), it is 
clear that an increase of ALMP participation increases ￿ and, 
consequently, the matching process.  
On the other hand, there may also be an opposite locking in 
effect if a′ is <1, i.e. if participants do not find job opportunities 
before programmes are completed or continue to have a low 
probability of being employed after the programme4.  
Job-matching improvement makes the hiring process of firms 
easier and then lowers the cost of posting vacancies, as well as 
limiting wage settings. In our model, these effects can be 
synthesized by a reduction of the reservation wage and 
reservation productivity. 
Reservation productivity and the reservation wage are also 
affected by the effects on competition for jobs and productivity 
effects. It is self evident that participation in ALMP (especially 
training programmes and job creation measures providing on-the-
job training) increases the productivity of job searchers, even if 
their reservation wages increase also. The net effect is an 
empirical issue. Employment subsidies, instead, directly decrease 
labour costs for the firm. ALMP participation may also have a 
positive effect on labour force participation, increasing the 
motivation to actively seek for work and therefore increasing the 
competition for the available jobs (Johansson, 2001).  
Finally, the desired effect of ALMP is to change the allocation 
of the work force between sectors, skills and regions (i.e. to reduce 
the degree of mismatch in our model). If there is full employment 
among skilled workers or in certain regions or sectors and wages 
are flexible,  employment subsidies or training programmes that try 
to increase the probability of hiring unskilled workers or workers 
                                                 
4 Caroleo and Pastore, 2004 have detected the existence of a “training trap” 
for youth unemployed in Italy in which participation in training programmes 
increases the probability of repeating this type of program without improving the 
probability of finding a job.    18
employed in regions with high unemployment and wage rigidity 
have a positive effect on output and employment.  
Equally, a policy that tries to reallocate workers from unskilled 
to skilled jobs, from low productivity sectors to high productivity 
sectors or from low labour demand regions to high labour demand 
regions, also have a positive effect on gross  output. As a 
consequence, if, for example, unskilled workers are retrained and 
become more skilled, the labour supply in the skilled sector 
augments and, if the wages become more flexible, labour demand 
augments to the same extent. On the other hand, the unskilled 
sector will be unaffected because of wage rigidity. (Layard, 1999; 
Calmfors, Forslund and Hemstòm 2002).  
An unintentional side effect is that ALMP may crowd out 
(displacement effect) regular labour demand (especially 
concerning to schemes of subsidized employment). In fact, a 
deadweight effect occurs when the same person would have been 
hired even in the absence of such subsidies and a substitution 
effect occurs when the subsidies lead employers to substitute one 
category of workers for another5. 
An indirect crowding-out effect can be found to the extent that 
ALMP improve the welfare of the unemployed: higher income 
rather than unemployment benefits for participants; a higher level 
of psychological well-being due to being employed; improvement 
in future labour market prospects; extension of income support 
beyond the maximum unemployment benefit period. In this case, 
the reservation wage is increased and the intensity of the job 
search is reduced. Wage pressure is increased.    
4. A Macroeconomic Evaluation of ALMP in Italy 
For these reasons, the net employment effect of ALMP is an 
empirical issue; thus, as the EES stressed, it is important to 
implement the monitoring and evaluation of these policies (Fay, 
                                                 
5 The displacement effect can have a positive employment effect to the 
extent that the employment of the long-term unemployed (outsiders) crowds out 
the employment of insiders, so that the latter group meets more competition and 
moderates wage settings.  19
1996). However, while monitoring has now been established in 
Italy (MLSP, various issues), evaluation has only been carried out 
so far according to the conventional programme-oriented approach 
to policy evaluation6.  
The empirical research on the effects of ALMP is of two types: 
microeconomic and macroeconomic. Microeconomic studies 
evaluate the effects of participation in ALMP for the participating 
individuals, comparing their labour market outcome to the outcome 
that would have prevailed if they had not participated in an active 
program. Macroeconomic studies examine aggregate, general 
equilibrium effects. The question is whether ALMP represent a net 
gain for the whole economy. There are two alternatives to 
consider: ALMP positively affect both unemployment and output or 
the effect is simple distributional, i.e. if work is shifted from the old 
to the young or from a region to another, etc. (Bellmann and 
Jackman, 1996). These studies concern the evaluation of a 
Beveridge curve or a matching function, as well as a wage-setting 
function, the evaluation of the direct, crowding-out effect or the 
effects of ALMP on labour force participation (Hujer and Caliendo 
2000).  
The method chosen to evaluate ALMP in Italy is a reduced 
form that allows estimating the net effects of ALMP participation on 
employment or unemployment in a regional framework (Hujer, 
Blien, Caliendo and Zeiss, 2002). This type of methodology has 
been applied especially in the studies based on OECD data 
explaining the cross-country variation in unemployment rates by 
the cross-country variation in a number of labour market 
institutions; one of them is ALMP (Layard, Nickell and Jackman, 
1991; Nickell, 1997; Scarpetta, 1996; Nickell and Layard, 1999; 
Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000)7.  
                                                 
6 For a comprehensive survey of the evaluation studies carried out in Italy, 
see Trivellato, Martini and Rettore, 2001. 
7 The main difference between studies based on OECD data and our 
methodology concerns the measure of ALMP. The former generally use the 
expenditure (as a percent of the GDP) on ALMP; we use the participants in 
programmes of active policies. The measure of ALMP, used in a large number of 
studies using OECD data is: γ=brr/uy (see appendix in Calmfors, Forslund and  20
There are a lot of weaknesses which arise in a 
macroeconomic assessment of active labour market policies. As 
we work with aggregated data, the results tend to become vague 
and less robust. We have to deal in many cases with relatively 
crude data, making use of proxy variables when necessary. 
However, the major problem is that of endogeneity or simultaneity. 
Given that governments react to rising unemployment or other 
labour market problems with increased policy efforts, it becomes 
very hard to distinguish the effect of policy on the labour market. 
Basically, expenditures on ALMP can affect the unemployment 
rate, and it may be equally the case that the level of 
unemployment affects spending on ALMP.  
Data based on the participation in active and passive labour 
policies was provided by the “Rapporto di Monitoraggio” of the 
MLPS, reconstructed on a monthly basis from 1996:1 to 2002:6 
and by regions. The main active policies are: a) Mixed cause 
contracts; b) subsidies for long-term or short-term employment; c) 
incentives for the stabilization of short-term contracts, d) Incentives 
for self-employment. In contrast to the OECD definition of ALMP, 
the “Rapporto di Monitoraggio” restricts analysis only to the 
measures for youth and employment subsidies. Recently, data has 
also been produced on training measures and on public 
employment services, but with no information on the time series.  
Outcome variables are the labour market indices representing 
the main objectives of the European Employment Strategy: the 
employment rate, the unemployment rate and the youth 
unemployment rate. 
The period refers to the years 1996-2002 which corresponds 
to a considerable, positive cycle of increase in employment. If we 
compare this period with a similar, previous one (1985-1991), we 
can observe that an increase in employment occurred in spite of a 
relative stagnation in economic growth. 
                                                                                                              
Hemstrom 2002). r is the number of participants as a fraction of the labour force, 
u is the unemployment rate, y is the GDP per capita, br is the expenditure on 
ALMP per programme participant. Consequently, the relation of the two measures 





∆ Employment rate 1,2%  1,0%
Employed per year 271.000 224.000
∆ PIL  +1,7% +2,7%
Employment/PIL elasticity  0,70  0,38
 
There are several explanations for that positive cycle: the 
introduction of new, more flexible forms of labour contracts 
(atypical contracts), an increase of the employment of women and 
employment in the service sector and the concurrence of a period 
of wage moderation. Moreover, one of the major explanations is 
the objective of our research: the implementation of the European 
Employment Strategy (begun in 1998) and a renewed impulse to 
ALMP.  
The following figures represent a broad measure of the 
relationship between the ALMP expenditures and the Passive 
Labour Market Policies (PLMP) expenditures made by the Italian 
regions. In this case, it can be noticed that, in the period from 1996 
to 2002, there was a generalized reduction in the percentage of 
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Source: MPLS, Rapporto di Monitoraggio various issues  23
5. Empirical Models of Labour Market Policies 
The empirical analysis is based on two econometric 
techniques thought to capture the possible effect that alternative 
active labour market policies might have on unemployment and 
employment dynamics. In particular, the aim of this empirical part 
consists of assessing whether ALMP could have different effects 
according to the particular region where the program has been 
implemented. The study employs panel data models for the 20 
Italian regions. Each model is estimated for several dependent 
variables including employment rate, unemployment rate and 
youth unemployment rate. The explicative variables are a set of 
active labour market policies. Moreover, some variables enter into 
the estimation as instruments. These variables are the GDP per-
capita, the gross-fix investments, the GDP per-worker and the 
school-attendance rate. 
The sample period goes from 1996:1 to 2002:6. The data 
used in the empirical analysis were drawn from different sources. 
The monthly data on the labour market policies have been 
provided by the Ministry of Welfare. The data on unemployment 
and employment are drawn from Istat. 
The significant difference between the Southern and the 
Northern Italian labour markets make it necessary to analyze both 
areas separately. The number of cross sections for Southern Italy 
is 8 and 12 for Northern Italy.  
As stated above, the study implements different econometric 
techniques to analyze the afore-mentioned issues. There are two 
techniques used. The first refers to the Generalized Method of 
Moment (GMM). The second consists of applying the Vector 
Autoregression framework to panel data (P-VAR).  
5.1 The effectiveness of alternative ALMP: a GMM Model 
The modern approach to the estimation of system 
instrumental variables is based on the principle of the generalized 
method of moment (GMM). In order to analyze the effects of ALMP 
on the unemployment rate, we estimate the following basic 
equation:  24
,, 11 11 , , ,
MCC SE JS
it it i t i t i t it it it uu x x x D α γϕ ϑη ε −− −− =++ + + + +
 (1) 
with 
1,....,    and   1,...., iN tT == . 
In the specified equation,  1
MCC
it x −  represents the mixed cause 
contracts ratio;  1
SE
it x −  is the subsidized employment ratio;  1
JS
it x −  
represents the job stabilization ratio;  , it D
 is a vector of time 
invariant region-specific effect;  , it η
 is a vector of region invariant 
time specific effect; and  , it ε
 is an i.i.d. vector of disturbances.  
Each ratio has been constructed as the total number of 
participants in a program in a particular region divided by the total 
number of working-age population of the same region. Then, the 
response coefficientsγ ,  ϕ  and ϑ  measure the effect that an 
increase of participants in active labour market programs has on 
unemployment dynamics.   
Time and region dummies are very important components of 
the specification. Time dummies may reduce the reverse causality 
problem if the timing of adverse shocks is correlated between 
regions. Region fixed effects capture all time-invariant institutional 
and economic characteristics explaining why one region has a 
different-from-average unemployment rate.  
The importance of these region-specific effects cannot be 
minimized. For example, since the mid-1990s, Abruzzo has spent, 
on the average, a lower percentage of the GDP on ALMP than 
Campania (4 percent for Abruzzo and 7 percent for Campania), yet 
Abruzzo had a higher business-sector employment rate in the 
sample period (35 percent compared to 26 percent for Campania). 
If only variables capturing institutional effects (which, in general, 
are not very precise) were used to control for region-specific 
effects, part of the differences in employment caused by other 
institutional factors would be wrongly attributed to ALMP spending.  25
The specification in equation (1) forms a dynamic panel data 
model, where the dependent variable is partly explained by its past 
value.  
We now concentrate on the relative ability of alternative active 
policies to affect the unemployment rate, the employment rate and 
the youth unemployment rate.  
The three policies we consider are the mixed cause contracts 
(henceforth, MCC); the subsidized employment (SE) that 
represents the sum of the subsidies for long-term or short-term 
hiring; and the job stabilization (JS), that is the incentives for the 
stabilization of short-term contracts and the incentives for self-
employment. 
The specified dynamic panel data model has been estimated 
by using three alternative methods. Table 1 reports the GMM 
estimator in first differences (GMM-DIF), the system estimator 
(GMM-SYS), and the OLS results. 
 
Table 1: GMM Estimates of the Unemployment Rate 
South
Coeff. Std.Error Coeff. Std.Error Coeff. Std.Error
Unemployment (t-1) 0.75 [0.05] 0.85 [0.03] 0.89 [0.02]
Mixed Cause Contracts (t-1) -0.10 [0.30] -0.17 [0.22] -0.14 [0.06]
Subsidized Employment (t-1) -0.44 [0.17] -0.21 [0.05] -0.23 [0.08]
Job Stabilization (t-1) -0.12 [0.05] -0.08 [0.04] -0.09 [0.03]
Statistic p-value Statistic p-value
Wald Test of Joint Significance 57.53 [0.000] 847.5 [0.000]
Wald Test of Dummies Significance 1151 [0.000] 24430 [0.000]
Sargan Test 87.25 [0.000] 56.47 [0.021]
First-order serial correlation -1.653 [0.098] -1.774 [0.076]
Second-order serial correlation -1.762 [0.078] -1.89 [0.047]
North
Coeff. Std.Error Coeff. Std.Error Coeff. Std.Error
Unemployment (t-1) 0.75 [0.02] 0.87 [0.28] 0.91 [0.01]
Mixed Cause Contracts (t-1) -0.35 [0.09] -0.32 [0.78] -0.31 [0.11]
Subsidized Employment (t-1) -0.14 [0.22] -0.10 [0.08] -0.19 [0.05]
Job Stabilization (t-1) -0.23 [0.11] -0.32 [0.15] -0.79 [0.28]
Statistic p-value Statistic p-value
Wald Test of Joint Significance 1325.0 [0.000] 507.2 [0.000]
Wald Test of Dummies Significance 4535.0 [0.000] 157.2 [0.000]
Sargan Test 59.3 [0.000] 61.8 [0.006]
First-order serial correlation -5.8 [0.000] -1.9 [0.061]





From Table 1 we can see that in the northern regions, an 
increase in the mixed cause contracts (MCC) produces a larger 
response in terms of unemployment reaction with a decrease of 35 
basis points in the GMM-DIF model. In the South, the response is 
much smaller. An increase of one percent in MCC induces a fall in 
the unemployment rate of 10 basis points. 
The results suggest that while SE is more effective in the 
South (-0.44) than in the North (-0.14), an increase in the job 
stabilization (JS) produces a larger decrease in the northern 
unemployment (-0.23) with respect to the fall in the southern 
unemployment rate (-0.12).  
Table 2 presents the results of the GMM estimates for the 
model in which the employment rate is considered the dependent 
variable. 
 
Table 2: GMM Estimates of the Employment Rate 
South
Coeff. Std.Error Coeff. Std.Error Coeff. Std.Error
Employment (t-1) 0.75 [0.03] 0.90 [0.04] 0.91 [0.02]
Mixed Cause Contracts (t-1) 0.19 [0.11] 0.22 [0.14] 0.17 [0.09]
Subsidized Employment (t-1) 0.50 [0.16] 0.42 [0.13] 0.37 [0.06]
Job Stabilization (t-1) 0.02 [0.03] 0.01 [0.05] 0.11 [0.02]
Statistic p-value Statistic p-value
Wald Test of Joint Significance 275.5 [0.000] 179.3 [0.000]
Wald Test of Dummies Significance 32890 [0.000] 1970 [0.000]
Sargan Test 76.09 [0.000] 59.5 [0.000]
First-order serial correlation -2.041 [0.041] -2.759 [0.006]
Second-order serial correlation -1.832 [0.067] -2.445 [0.008]
North
Coeff. Std.Error Coeff. Std.Error Coeff. Std.Error
Employment (t-1) 0.80 [0.02] 0.89 [0.01] 0.90 [0.01]
Mixed Cause Contracts (t-1) 0.30 [0.11] 0.32 [0.07] 0.33 [0.06]
Subsidized Employment (t-1) 0.33 [0.12] 0.21 [0.12] 0.21 [0.13]
Job Stabilization (t-1) 0.36 [0.17] 0.37 [0.15] 0.63 [0.32]
Statistic p-value Statistic p-value
Wald Test of Joint Significance 1386.0 [0.000] 4514.0 [0.000]
Wald Test of Dummies Significance 1837.0 [0.000] 800.0 [0.000]
Sargan Test 75.2 [0.000] 115.8 [0.000]
First-order serial correlation -2.8 [0.006] -2.6 [0.009]




Also in this case, a rise of 1% in the mixed caused contracts 
induces a larger increase in the northern employment rate (0.30) 
than in Southern employment (0.19). The opposite is true for the 
other active policy we considered. In the South, an increase in SE 
lead to a rise in the employment rate of 0.5%, while in the North 
the effect is of an increase of 0.33%. 
The evidence coming from Table 2 corroborates the finding 
shown for the unemployment rate model. In fact, the coefficients 
for the selected policy are both significant. However, it seems that 
while JS exerts a greater effect in the South, MCC is more efficient 
in the North. 
Finally, we look at the ability of the three active policy 
indicators to reduce the youth unemployment rate. 
The relative size of the coefficients observed above is not 
valid when we consider the ability of the policy in reducing the 
youth unemployment rate. In fact, Table 3 suggests a higher JS 
coefficient for the North as well as a lower MCC coefficient for the 
South. In general, the active labour policy response coefficients for 
























Table 3: GMM Estimates of the Youth Unemployment Rate 
South
Coeff. Std.Error Coeff. Std.Error Coeff. Std.Error
Youth Unemployment (t-1) 0.90 [0.03] 0.87 [0.03] 0.91 [0.02]
Mixed Cause Contracts (t-1) -0.25 [0.13] -0.23 [0.15] -0.10 [0.49]
Subsidized Employment (t-1) -0.31 [0.11] -0.43 [0.16] -0.41 [0.18]
Job Stabilization (t-1) -0.13 [0.26] -0.13 [0.16] -0.27 [0.13]
Statistic p-value Statistic p-value
Wald Test of Joint Significance 2206 [0.000] 579.6 [0.000]
Wald Test of Dummies Significance 388 [0.000] 13990 [0.000]
Sargan Test 79.32 [0.000] 65.9 [0.002]
First-order serial correlation -1.923 [0.054] -1.951 [0.051]
Second-order serial correlation -1.58 [0.114] 0.1764 [0.860]
North
Coeff. Std.Error Coeff. Std.Error Coeff. Std.Error
Youth Unemployment (t-1) 0.69 [0.03] 0.81 [0.02] 0.78 [0.01]
Mixed Cause Contracts (t-1) -0.38 [0.62] -0.38 [0.29] -0.46 [0.52]
Subsidized Employment (t-1) -0.80 [1.68] -0.83 [1.15] -0.68 [0.30]
Job Stabilization (t-1) -0.52 [2.39] -0.47 [1.68] -0.21 [2.51]
Statistic p-value Statistic p-value
Wald Test of Joint Significance 32.4 [0.000] 350.0 [0.000]
Wald Test of Dummies Significance 5056.0 [0.000] 283.7 [0.000]
Sargan Test 98.2 [0.000] 61.5 [0.007]
First-order serial correlation -6.0 [0.000] -2.6 [0.009]





5.2 Unemployment, ALMP and Atypical Contracts: a P-VAR model 
There has been a growing interest in using panel VAR models 
for applied labour policy analysis. Problems concerning the 
evaluation of the effect of regional policies are naturally studied in 
this framework. Vector autoregression (VAR) models are widely 
used in econometric studies in a broad variety of fields. The 
extension to panel data represents an interesting challenge due to 
the possible presence of cross-sectional heterogeneity.  
Let us consider a panel VAR model with fixed time dimension 
T and derive asymptotic properties of a proposed estimation 
method with respect to the cross-sectional dimension N.   29
In particular, we estimate a second order VAR using a four 
variables system of the unemployment rate, participation rate, a 
ratio of atypical contracts over the total employees and active 
labour market policy. The reason why we include atypical contracts 
in the estimated model leads from the consideration that, in recent 
years, there have been significant change in the structure of 
employment. This structural change has resulted in a decrease in 
permanent, full-time 'typical' employment and an increase in the 
so-called 'atypical', 'contingent' or 'non-standard' employment.  
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where  t u  is the unemployment rate;  , it p
 represent the 
participation ratio;  , it AC
 is a ratio of atypical contracts; and 
t ALMPis the active labour market policy rate as constructed 
above;  () CL
 is a finite-order lag polynomial matrix. The region 
fixed effects, i.e. the vectorD , account for institutional differences 
as well as other region-specific unobserved influences on 
unemployment. This means that the system allows for different 
region-specific constant terms in each equation, since some 
regions may have a higher average unemployment rate and active 
labour policy than others, for reasons that are not captured by the 
explanatory variables. In the specified model, the four variables 
are assumed to be stationary. The structure of this system 
incorporates feedback relationship between  t u  and  t ALMP. This 
means that the two variables are allowed to affect each other  30
contemporaneously. The contemporaneous relations among the 
variables are described in the A matrix. 
The structural model has a VAR representation: 
, ,, 1
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with  ()
'
t t Ee e =Σ
  
The identification of the structural parameters has solved 
imposing linear restriction on the elements of A and B taking into 
accounts the following relation between VAR innovations and 
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Starting from the  2
) 1 ( + n n
 free elements of Σ ˆ , the lack of 
identification emerges from the estimation of 
2 2 n n +  parameters 
contained in A and B. 
The identification problem is solved by restricting the 
contemporaneous relation matrix to a lower triangular form. This 
solution imposes a recursive structure on the economy, resulting in 
a particular causal ordering of the variables in the system. In 




31 32 33 ,,
41 42 43 44
,,
100 0 000
10 0 0 00


















                =                          
The assumption ( 14 0 a = ) means that  t ALMP  does not have 
a contemporaneous effect on  t u . In other words, both 
u
t ε  and 
ALMP
t ε shocks effect the contemporaneous value of t ALMP, but 
only 
u
t ε  shocks affect the contemporaneous value of  t u .  
The timing of the model can be summarized as follows: a 
shock to labour policy instruments ALMP in period t affects the 
unemployment rate at time t+1. In fact, at time t the unemployment 
rate is predetermined, so it cannot be influenced by any policy 
instrument. For example, an increase in active labour policy leads 
to a rise in labour force participation, thereby facilitating a 
decrease in the unemployment rate. 
The outlined model has been estimated separately for south 
and north. Moreover, for each macro area we estimated two 
different models: in Model 1 the variable AC consists of the ratio of 
the part-time workers over the number total employees, while in 
Model 2 AC is the ratio of fixed-term workers over the total 
dependent employees.  
The four different specifications (Model 1 and Model 2 for 
South and North) are estimated to assess the possible 
asymmetries between northern and southern region 
unemployment in response to a shock to AC and ALMP. 
5.3 Results of Impulse-Response Analysis 
In this section we present the estimated dynamic effects of AC 
and active labour policy shocks on unemployment. In particular, 
we examine the similarity of the unemployment responses in each 
area. This is accomplished by using impulse response functions  32
with a structural decomposition of the variance covariance matrix 
explained above. A 20-quarter horizon is considered. 
The estimated responses to a 1% increase in unemployment 
and ALMP are reported in Figures 6, 7, 8 and 9. Each response is 
provided with the associated asymptotic confidence bands. 
The impulse responses for the southern regions are 
significantly larger than those for the northern regions. The 
patterns of the responses are qualitatively similar in the two areas. 
Importantly, the results also suggest that the unemployment rate in 
the selected regions responds to identical labour policy shocks 
with different speeds and movements, as well as with different 
dimensions of the effects. 
In fact, a positive ALMP shock decreases unemployment. 
Moreover, after an initial delay, the response function shows a 
hump-shaped pattern that reaches the maximum decline after 
roughly two years in the North and three years in the South. 
The different adjustment speeds of the unemployment rates to 
ALMP shocks for the two selected areas can be partly explained 
by the existence of a higher degree of labour market rigidities in 
the South. This finding suggests the need for an improvement in 
the 'efficiency' of the labour market functioning. 
On the other hand, the different dimensions of the effect can 
be explained by considering the existing differences both in the 
number of vacancies and in the unemployed of the two areas. 
While the northern regions are characterized by a large number of 
vacancies and a small number of unemployed (the upper part of 
the Beveridge curve), in the southern regions there are a small 
number of vacancies and a large number of unemployed (the 
lower part of the Beveridge curve). It follows that an identical 









Figure 6 Impulse-Response Analysis for the South: Model 1 
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Figure 8 Impulse-Response Analysis for the North – Model 1 
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The average response and the maximum impact of a 
contractionary labour policy shock are shown in Table 8.  
 
Table 8 Estimated Response Function Features 
Part-time Almp Fixed-term Almp Part-time Almp Fixed-term Almp
-0.01 -0.09 -0.04 -0.12 -0.13 -0.14 -0.04 -0.34
-0.06 -0.19 -0.12 -0.23 -0.20 -0.24 -0.07 -0.53
61 01 01 0 1 29 1 01 1




Time to die out
South North
M o d e l  1M o d e l  2M o d e l  1M o d e l  2
 
 
Table 8 outlines some key characteristics of the estimated 
response functions. In particular, the table gives information about 
the maximum impact and the average responses of the 
unemployment rate to ALMP and AC structural shock. The table 
also considers the time that a shock takes to exert its maximum 
effect on unemployment as well as the time to die out.  
Despite some qualitative similarities, the table seems to 
suggest a different quantitative response across regions. In both 
areas, an ALMP shock produces a decline in the unemployment 
rate. However, the dimension of the effect is quite dissimilar. While 
in the South the unemployment rate decreases by more than 20 
basis points (Model 2 - South), an ALMP shock in the North 
reduces the unemployment rate by 53 basis points (Model 2 - 
North). The maximum impact of the fixed-term is observed in the 
southern regions: -12 basis points. Moreover, the effect of fixed-
term shock reaches its maximum effect later than in the North. It 
means that in the Southern regions, the unemployment rate 
appears to be more influenced by the changes in the number of 
fixed-term contracts. Finally, concerning the time the shock takes 
to die out, there are no large differences across regions. A fixed-
term shock lasts longer in southern regions. However, an ALMP 
shock seems to be more persistent in the north.  
Asymmetries are also detected in the response of 
unemployment rate to an exogenous part-time shock. Again, the 
largest responses are observed in the North; in particular, the 
response of unemployment in the northern regions reaches a  36
maximum of twenty basis points after 12 months, while the 
reaction of the southern Italian regions is smaller and quicker: six 
basis points after 6 months. 
5.4 Results of Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (FEVD) 
An important tool developed in the S-VAR framework is the 
forecast error variance decomposition. The main strength of this 
analysis is its ability to capture the weight of different variable 
innovations on a given variable forecast error variance 
decomposition.  
In other words, it gives information on the percentage of 
variation in the forecast error of a variable explained by its own 
innovation and the proportion explained by innovations in other 
variables at different horizon.  
Table 9 depicts the forecast error variance decomposition of 
the unemployment rate, in the four model estimated above and up 
to two year horizon, due to the four structural shocks. 
 
Table 9: Fraction of the Unemployment Rate that FEVD attributed to the four 
structural shocks 
Horizon Unemp. Partic. Part-time Almp Unemp. Partic. Fixed-term Almp
1 100 0 0 0 100 0 0 0
6 95.4 0.8 0.3 3.2 91.0 0.5 2.3 6.5
12 83.1 2.3 0.8 13.4 79.2 1.6 9.9 9.7
18 80.6 3.4 1.3 14.7 76.7 2.3 10.9 10.2
24 79.6 3.6 1.7 15.1 75.7 2.5 11.3 10.6
Horizon Unemp. Partic. Part-time Almp Unemp. Partic. Fixed-term Almp
1 100 0 0 0 100 0 0 0
6 83.1 6.3 3.8 6.7 83.5 6.4 5.4 4.7
12 65.4 8.8 17.3 8.5 71.1 9.6 10.1 9.3
18 56.9 8.4 25.4 9.3 68.8 9.1 10.7 11.4









From the above table we can retrieve useful information about 
the relative power of ALMP and AC in affecting the unemployment 
dynamics at different horizons. 
Hence, according to the variance decomposition at short 
horizons, ALMP innovations do not play a major role in the monthly 
fluctuations of the unemployment rate. The dynamics of 
unemployment is largely dominated by its own shocks and indicate 
that short-run fluctuations in the unemployment rate display no 
association with active labour market programs as well as with the 
dynamics of the atypical contracts. For long horizons, we find that 
both ALMP and atypical contracts exert ac certain role in 
determining the unemployment dynamics. This influence varies 
across the regions.  
In the southern regions, the unemployment is essentially 
driven by its own shocks. The fixed-term ratio, although greater 
than the part-time variable, do not significantly affect the 
movements in the unemployment rate. After two years, it explains 
11% of the unemployment changes. Also the ALMP shocks do not 
seems to explain more than a 15% of the unemployment changes.  
On the contrary, in the northern regions, the unemployment 
dynamics seem to be partially explained by the increase in the 
atypical contracts. In particular, the movements in the part-time 
ratio, after 2 years, explain almost 30% of the unemployment 
variation. 
We can conclude that the unemployment dynamics is 
differently explained in the two areas. In the South neither ALMP 
nor AC seems to explain the changes in the unemployment rate: 
the unemployment is driven by its own shocks. On the contrary, in 
the northern regions, the unemployment dynamics is significantly 
explained by the part-time workers dynamics. 
6. Conclusions 
The paper dealt with the theoretical and the empirical 
measurement of the of the ALMP ability to reduce regional 
unemployment.  
The relevance of the issues is related to the possible 
asymmetries the differences in the economic structure of the  38
Italian regions may arise concerning the effectiveness of 
alternative labour market programs. 
The econometric methodologies implemented were the 
Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) and the Panel Vector 
Autoregression (P-VAR). 
Concerning the GMM framework, we estimated a single 
equation dynamic panel data model for several dependent 
variables including employment rate, unemployment rate and 
youth unemployment rate. The evidence emerging from these 
models suggested that the effects of ALMP on unemployment are 
not similar across the Italian regions. Some programs are likely to 
exert a greater effect in the South than in the North. 
The second methodology relies on the P-VAR framework. We 
estimated four different models in order to outline the effect that 
ALMP and the atypical contracts have on the unemployment 
dynamics.  
The impulse-response analysis highlighted the presence of 
divergences across the Italian regions. Importantly, the results 
suggest that the unemployment rate in the selected regions 
responds to identical labour policy shocks with different speeds 
and movement, as well as with different dimensions of the effects. 
The same it is true for the response of unemployment rate to AC 
shocks. 
Finally, the forecast error variance decomposition provides 
information on how much various structural shocks affect the 
behaviour of each variable at different horizons. From this analysis 
we conclude that the unemployment dynamics is differently 
explained in the two areas. In the South neither ALMP nor AC 
seems to explain the changes in the unemployment rate: the 
unemployment is driven by its own shocks. On the contrary, in the 
northern regions, the unemployment dynamics is significantly 
explained by the part-time workers dynamics.  39
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